Is Democracy good for women? Essay

Democracy without women is no democracy! (Declaration †¦ of Independent Women’s Democratic Initiative 1991:127) Women have tried to change the contours of a male-defined concept of democracy and assert the struggles for democracy which have been present within women’s movements as integral to a democratic body politic. (Rowbotham 1986: 106-107) Democracy is not something which, as a matter of ill-fated fact, has failed to deliver on its promises to women. It exemplifies ideals which guarantee that it will never deliver unless it gets on upon wide critical examination of its own philosophical assumptions. In brief, the charge made against democracy is that, for women, it was never more than an article of faith, and while two hundred years of democratization have failed (and are still failing) to bring equality for women, even faith is giving out. The uncharitable might interpret these remarks as nothing more than proof of feminist paranoia and of women’s general incapability to distinguish when they are well off. It is therefore significant to stress that the charge is not simply that democratic states are, as a matter of fact, ones in which women are deprived (though they are), but rather that democratic theory is, as a matter of principle, devoted to ideals which guarantee that that will remain so. As a faith, democracy was always a false faith, and its prophets (including nearly all the main political philosophers of the past two hundred years) are now exposed as false prophets. These are staid, depressing, and even dangerous charges. The more so if we have no preferred substitute to democracy, and no revised interpretation of its central ideals. The tasks for modern feminism are therefore twofold: first, to justify the claim that traditional democratic theory leads to undemocratic practice; secondly, to recognize the ways in which that theory might be reinterpreted so as to come closer to democratic ideals. The previous is feminism’s critique of the faith; the latter is feminism’s revision of the faith. Feminist theory and practice occupies a revealing position in debates concerning the relationship between social movements and democracy. As both a social movement and an academic body of thinking. It also offers a distinguishing, if marginalized, theoretical contribution. Though feminists are not the only movement contributors to have been both objects of and subjects in academic debates, they are debatably unique in emphasizing issues of democratic barring and inclusion. This emphasis stems from the chronological experience of women’s marginalization in the polity, their subordination within fundamental movements, and the complexities that feminists have faced in their attempt to create an independent, comprehensive movement of women. From these experiences, two discrete trails of analysis have emerged. The first, feminist democratic theory focuses on the integration of women in the polity. The second, emerging from debates concerning feminist organizing, centers on the democratization of relationships within the movement itself. Both are entrenched in a critique of the masculinity limits of liberal, republican, and leftist democratic theory and practices and are entrusting to constructing liberal, inclusive, and participatory alternatives. Since Mary Wollstonecraft, generations of women and some men wove painstaking arguments to demonstrate that excluding women from modern public and political life contradicts the liberal democratic promise of universal emancipation and equality. They identified the liberation of women with expanding civil and political rights to include women on the same terms as men, and with the entrance of women into the public life dominated by men on an equal basis with them. After two centuries of faith that the ideal of equality and fraternity included women have still not brought emancipation for women, contemporary feminists have begun to question the faith itself. (Young 1987: 93) Women’s marginalization within liberal democratic institutions was simply obvious at the end of the nineteenth century and the start of the twentieth. The vote was regularly extended, at least supposedly, to all adult men decades before it was to women. Full female suffrage was not won in Great Britain, for instance, until 1928. In France it was not granted until after the Second World War and in Switzerland not until the seventies. Early feminists felt that the elimination of women from the vote and other rights and privileges liberals accorded to â€Å"mankind† was conflicting and ignorant, a hangover of pre-Enlightenment prejudice and tradition that needed only to be brought to public attention to be remedied. However, it â€Å"turned out to be the merest tip of the iceberg: a daunting hint at deeper structures that stay women politically unequal† (Phillips 1993: 103). This is not to say that women do not use their vote as often or as autonomously as men. This has been the conclusion of some non-feminist studies of female voting behavior, which have argued that women are apolitical and ready to delegate decision making to the male head of family. Consequent feminist studies have concluded that gender disparities in voting behavior are extremely context specific, stratified by social and geographic location, and expected to diminish as women gain access to education and formal employment (Randall 1987: 50-53; Conway et al. 1997: 77-80; Baxter and Lansing 1983: 17-39). though, once we move beyond the vote, the participation of women of all backgrounds in those institutions inner to the functioning of liberal democracies, from parties to lobbying groups, remains considerably less than that of comparable men, though the proportion still varies eventually and space (Randall 1987: 53-58; Conway et al. 1997: 80-128). At the utmost levels of government, the numbers of women shrink radically, with little difference between democratic and non-democratic regimes. A sweeping experiential survey of both reveals: A bleak picture of women’s contribution as national leaders, cabinet ministers, members of national legislatures and sittings in the high civil service. At the end of 1990, only 6 of the 159 countries represented in the United Nations had women as chief executives. In almost 100 countries men held all the senior and deputy ministerial positions in 1987-89. Worldwide, only 10 percent of national lawmaking seats were held by women in 1987. (Chowdhury et al. 1994:15) There are disparities in the degree of women’s participation, even at this level. Most notably, Nordic countries have long outpaced other liberal democracies in the percentage of women in their legislatures as of facilitating welfare reforms, an democratic culture, and the overture of political quotas. For instance, women made up 37. 5 percent of the legislature in Norway in 1994 (Nelson and Chowdhury 1994: 775) and 47. 4 percent of the cabinet in 1991 (Bowker-Sauer 1991: 277). Jane Jaquette has argued that there were obvious increases in indicators of women’s demonstration in many regions during the 1990s. Yet the figures she cites underline the devastating reality of continuing female marginalization: â€Å"In the United States, women now make up 11. 2 per cent of Congress†; more than double the figure of 1987, certainly, but the fact remains that men still constitute 88. 8 percent (1997: 26-27). To take another example, women gained around 20 percent of the seats in the British Parliament in the 1997 elections. This was a vivid rise, but one leaving around 80 percent of representatives male. What is more, these advances remain brittle. In the British case, they were the consequence of the victorious Labour Party having ensured that a percentage of its candidate shortlists were composed of women, a move that consequently was ruled illegal. Finally, any advances have been compensated by the sharp drop in female levels of contribution during the East Central European transitions to liberal democracy. The significant point to recognize is that Nordic uniqueness and recent incremental advances in some countries do not basically alter the stark and relatively static discrepancy between male and female levels of contribution in liberal democratic institutions wide-reaching. Women have also not been incorporated as equals into substitute visions of democracy. The previously Marxist-Leninist regimes in East Central Europe made an overt effort to establish a considerable women’s presence within their policy-making institutions, attaining an average proportion of between 25 and 35 percent. Though, this was again much lower than women’s presence in the general population and it was attainned through quotas. Though they are not essentially undemocratic in themselves, quotas meshed with male-dominated, authoritarian rule to inflict a female presence lacking in legitimacy, autonomy, and real power. Additionally, efforts to democratize relations of production continued circumscribed by the top-down imposition of decisions by the party and by ongoing gender hierarchies within the party, workplace, and home. Women were integrated in large numbers into the workers but in lower paid, lower status work. They remained burdened with domestic responsibilities, and their capability for autonomy at work and in the home was thus not efficiently increased (Jaquette 1997: 27; Janova and Sineau 1992: 119-123). Anti-colonial radical movements that arose elsewhere throughout the twentieth century, from Vietnam to Nicaragua, were apparently more popular-democratic in nature and often succeeded in mobilizing large numbers of women in a wide diversity of roles. Though, they have also shown a propensity to relapse to more traditional divisions of labor on attaining state power, excluding women from positions of authority. The record is not much better for fundamental movements that are not primarily tilting toward gaining state power. The New Left, for instance, mobilized many women and was distinguished by an egalitarian, participatory democratic ethic, but it generated mainly male spokespeople and privileged masculinist modes of behavior. It also failed to challenge the sexual objectification of women and channeled them into community-oriented activism and supportive, administrative tasks (Evans 1979: 108-155, 177-179). Similar stories of women’s subordination and the trivialization of their concerns have emerged from more recent fundamental nonstatist movements’ organizations, from the Israeli peace group â€Å"The 21st Year† (Rapoport and Sasson-Levy 1997: 8) to the ecological activists â€Å"Earth First! † (Sturgeon 1997: 49-57). A major approaching of early second-wave feminist thought was the classification of gender itself as a site and source of hierarchical power, functioning to benefit masculine traits, roles, and values over feminine comparables. This brought with it an prominence on the pervasiveness of power and a focus on its operations at the micro level of daily interactions, or what Nira Yuval-Davis calls â€Å"primary social relations† (1997a: 13). This contrasted with the focus of most modernist approaches on power in â€Å"more distant secondary social relations† (Yuval-Davis 1997a: 13), namely the state and/or economy. Early second-wave feminists explicated the causes and operations of gendered power under the rubric of patriarchy. The factual meaning of patriarchy as rule of the father, â€Å"the principle of the authority of senior males over juniors, male as well as female† (Uberoi 1995: 196), was stretched in very diverse directions. It was conceptualized by â€Å"radical† feminists as the primary and most essential form of power, exercised by all men over all women all through the world and originating in either male biological capacities and psychological disaffection or women’s susceptibility to physical attack and pregnancy. Patriarchy in this sense was understood to be retained through male aggression, the philosophy of heterosexuality, and the institutionalization of both in marriage and the family. on the contrary, feminists working within Marxist and socialist theoretical traditions concerted on the operations of patriarchy in capitalist modernity. Some argued that capitalism was essentially patriarchal, with varying stress given to the gendered division of labor, the reproductive role of women, or the purpose of the household within the economy. Others insisted that patriarchy and capitalism were distinct if inter-related systems of power, though they disagreed on the specific nature of that interrelationship. All established that neither patriarchy nor capitalism must be systematically or politically privileged, both being equally major forms of power. In addition, socialist feminists agreed that patriarchy was a property of structures that located both women and men in patterned roles within society. Most socialist and radical feminists held to the view that it was both potential and essential to abolish patriarchal and capitalist power relations and thus form a power-free world. A third strand in second-wave feminist thinking concerning gender and power drawing a division between power over as authority and control and power to as creative capacity, exercised in involvement with others rather than at their expense. The latter form of power also featured as an significant strand in republican thinking. Feminists have argued that it reflects especially feminine, relational modes of being and acting, of the kind typically exercised in close realms of life and in local communities. Such arguments have usually not been intended as a refusal of theories of patriarchal power over but do adapt them by insisting that women’s experiences are not completely negative and that their capacity for agency must be recognized alongside the constraints imposed upon it. This entails that patriarchal power has not completely prevented women from making an involvement to democracy although it has ensured that their involvement has not been fully valued. Second-wave feminist criticisms of the limited extent of most formulations of democracy focus predominantly on the dissimilarity between public and private life. Many feminists have accepted the force of Marx’s analysis of the liberal divide between public life and the private world of civil society. though, they have added that both liberalism and Marxism, and other approaches to democracy, rely on and reify a diverse public/private peculiarity, that between the domestic realm and the rest of social life (Pateman 1989: 118-140). The gendered nature of the domestic globe was openly recognized and defended in early moderate and republican work, and criticized in some Marxist and anarchist tracts, but it has since been included within the nebulous mass of civil society. Women’s continued involvement with the domestic, and the positioning of the domestic as especially private and outside of the public, has served to accept the relations of inequality between the genders that structure all dominions of life and to ensure that most women remain politically indiscernible. Whereas some second-wave feminists have formed historical and transcultural theories of this trend, others have stressed that it’s precise formulation and the consequences for women have diverse over time and place. Carole Pateman’s significant analysis of the recasting of this relationship in modernity (1989) describes a evolution from a monumental public patriarchal order, in which paternal control of the household was subordinated to a masculine hierarchy descending downwards from God and the King, to a system of private patriarchy whereby male heads of households were reconstituted as free and equal agents in the public globe through the continuation of hierarchical gender relations in the home. This meant that the state and the allegedly private civil sphere were constructed as fraternal associations of especially masculine equals. This argument is resistant by feminist critiques of the masculinist and Eurocentric character of public modes of behavior and language, such as balanced speech and impartial judgment. Feminists have argued that the supremacy of these modes is predicated on the relegation to the private sphere of bodily, affective, and illogical ways of being and those people, including women, who are considered to mark those (Young 1987). Perhaps most feminist investigations of the public/private divide in modernity, mainly those influenced by Marxism, have focused on the gendered division of labor under capitalism: the methodical allocation of accountability for â€Å"public,† paid work to men and â€Å"private,† unpaid labor to women. This is not an argument that women have been completely absent from the public economy. Total imprisonment to the home must be understood as a bourgeois ambition rather than a reality for most women. It was legitimately rejected in apparently socialist regimes and is increasingly being redundant by women of all classes in most locations. Though, women still take on the irresistible responsibility for family and domestic chores and this, joint with associated ideologies of domesticity, romance, and sexuality, channels them into marginalized, subordinated, and frequently sexualized roles in the formal economy. Precisely where the causal means in this process has been situated by feminists has depended on their precise analysis of the way patriarchy works and its relationship with capitalism. There has, conversely, been general agreement on the effects. In the West, women are intense in public welfare provision and service sectors, clerical and non-unionized manufacturing occupations, and part-time and lower paid rungs of the workforce. Women in emergent economies carry out the bulk of textile and electronics production, typically in non-unionized conditions that are often appalling. Those on the fringes of the world economy eke out a living from marginal agriculture, the informal economy, and sexual and domestic work. The dual burden of insecure and low-paid work in the formal economy and domestic chores in the private sphere operates as what feminist political scientists call a â€Å"situational constraint,† restrictive the participation of women, particularly those from certain classes, races, and locations, in public, political activities (Randall 1987: 127-129). All the above arguments focus on the gendered segregations arising from the restraints of politics to the public sphere. Feminist analysis also entails that the gendered hierarchies of the private sphere require to be recognized as political. This was the interpretation behind one of the most renowned second-wave slogans, â€Å"the personal is political. † The slogan insisted that in fact personal issues typically faced by isolated individuals behind closed doors such as whether to have sex, whether to have children, or how to systematize caring roles and responsibilities were analytically shaped by structures and relations of power that disadvantaged women relative to men. These power relations also limited women’s entree to partaking in those areas of life more characteristically understood as political and they requisite collective contestation (Randall 1987: 12-13). Effectively, this necessitated a refusal of restricted notions of politics as a characteristic activity separated out from social life, or as limited to a explicit realm or social struggle. Politics was extended to encompass the maintenance or contestation of coercive power relations wherever they were marked. This is a fundamentally agonistic formulation of politics as essentially confliction. It brought with it a liberal notion of democratic politics as the contestation of coercive power relations, and the disparities and marginalization they produce, in even the most intimate areas of life. It could be argued that this too is an agonistic formulation, one that anticipates the postmodern reconfiguration of democracy as a continuing process of conflict and contestation rather than an attainable end state. However, there is another element to the expansive feminist formulation of democracy, and that is the ambition to construct more cooperative, inclusive, and participatory relationships between individual women and the community. Certainly, second-wave feminists have had greatly different visions of possible â€Å"utopias† to which they desired and they have advocated very diverse routes to get there. Moreover, their arguments have hardly ever been articulated using the language of democracy per se. But the general point remains that much of untimely second-wave feminism sought to ease the self-determination and creative flowering of individual women and the development of more democratic and authentically consensual relationships between women and/or between women and men. This reverberates strongly with revolutionary arguments about democracy. One cause for the second-wave emphasis on participatory modes of democracy was a distress with women’s political agency and its chronological erasure. â€Å"Male stream† approaches to democracy were condemned for universalizing masculinist ideas concerning who can act in democracy and how they do and must act, in ways that function to eliminate women or marginalize their activities. One center of criticism was the liberal notion of the political subject as an asocial individual affianced in the rational pursuit of pregiven ends. Drawing on histories of the social and cultural collision of gender roles, psychoanalytic theories of gender establishment, and the experience of giving birth and living in families, feminists have argued that women hardly ever have the opportunity or the desire to live as entirely separate and discrete persons to the degree presumed by liberal ontology. Men can do so simply if they distance themselves from feminine traits and roles, relying on women to assume the major accountability for domestic labor and emotional interrelationships in the domestic spheres. The more social conceptualization of citizenship put onward by republicans, whereby individual autonomy is achieved through public consideration, has been seen as little better as it shares with liberalism the insistence that all corporal differences and particularist emotional attachments should be transcended in the public sphere. In early liberal and republican formulations, the gendered allegations of this move were made explicit. The bodily disparities of women from men and their involvement with sexuality, childbirth, and childrearing earned them a subsidiary service role in the private (Jones 1990: 790-792). Also, second-wave feminists have noted that the chronological connection between nationality and military service, predominantly evident in republican formulations, has resistant women’s internment to the private by positioning them as vulnerable and in require of protection. The fact that women finally won formal inclusion as citizens (and, somewhat, as soldiers) has not, many feminists have argued, altered the fundamental masculinist model. Women’s participation is probable to remain partial and driven with disagreements. This is supported by the findings of feminist political scientists with consider to the situational constraints faced by women with childcare responsibilities and the socialization of young girls into domestic roles and inert traits, both of which bound women’s capacity to become political actors as conservatively understood (Randall 1987: 123-126). A final area of second-wave feminist criticism has drawn consideration to the limits of strategies for change in â€Å"male stream† democratic frameworks. This is not to contradict that many feminists have established conventional strategies. Reformism has been and remains advocated by those working within laissez-faire and social democratic frameworks, who insist that women have to grab the opportunity to lobby for incremental change by exercising their vote and organizing cooperatively as an interest group to put more direct pressure on states, parties, and legislatures. The state is seen here as an unbiased arbiter of contradictory interests those women have an equal chance to shape to their purposes if they muster collectively. Their capability to do so, welfare liberal and social democratic feminists add, can be eased through economic redistribution. Such an approach has long been condemned by other feminists for its lack of radicalism, its search for compromise, and its emphasis on the activities of comparatively educated and economically privileged women. A conservatively Marxist model of revolutionary change through seizure of the state has often been pursued by more left wing feminists, often from within existing leftist organizations. The argument here is that gendered relations of power will collapse with capitalism and the liberal state, and a state proscribed in the interests of the working classes will facilitate a more substantive democracy for both women and men to expand. This view has been condemned by those who snub to subordinate feminist demands to anti-capitalist struggle. As the experience of so-called socialist states established, such subordination is probable to continue after the revolution. Gendered inequalities, though they may be considerably reconfigured, are unlikely to be determinedly overturned. Reference: †¢ Baxter, Sandra, and Marjorie Lansing. 1983. Women and Politics: The Visible Majority. Rev. ed. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. †¢ Bowker-Sauer. 1991. Who’s Who of Women in World Politics. London: Bowker? Sauer. †¢ Chowdhury, Najma, and Barbara J. Nelson, with Kathryn A. Carver, Nancy J. Johnson, and Paula L. O’Loughlin. 1994. â€Å"Redefining Politics: Patterns of Women’s Political Engagement from a Global Perspective. † In Barbara J. Nelson and Najma Chowdhury, eds. Women and Politics Worldwide. New Haven and London: Yale University Press. †¢ Conway, M. Margaret, Gertrude A Steuernagel, and David W. Ahern. 1997. Women and Political Participation: Cultural Change in the Political Arena. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press. †¢ Declaration from the Founder Members’ Meeting of the Independent Women’s Democratic Initiative. 1991. â€Å"Democracy Without Women Is No Democracy! † Feminist Review 39: 127-132. †¢ Evans, Sara. 1979. Personal Politics: The Roots of Women’s Liberation in the Civil Rights Movement and the New Left. New York: Vintage Books. †¢ Janova, Mira, and Mariette Sineau. 1992. â€Å"Women’s Participation in Political Power in Europe: An Essay in East-West Comparison. † Women’s Studies International Forum 11/1: 115-128. †¢ Jaquette, Jane S. 1997. â€Å"Women in Power: From Tokenism to Critical Mass. † Foreign Policy 108: 23-37. †¢ Nelson, Barbara J. , and Najma Chowdhury, eds. 1994. Women and Politics Worldwide. New Haven and London: Yale University Press. †¢ Pateman, Carole. 1989. The Disorder of Woman: Democracy, Feminism and Political Theory. 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London: Routledge. †¢ Uberoi, Patricia. 1995. â€Å"Problems with Patriarchy: Conceptual Issues in Anthropology and Feminism. † Sociological Bulletin 44/2: 195-221. †¢ Young, 1987. â€Å"Impartiality and the Civic Public: Some Implications of Feminist Critiques of Moral and Political Theory. † In Seyla Benhabib and Drucilla Cornell, eds. Feminism as Critique: Essays on the Politics of Gender in Late-Capitalist Societies. Cambridge: Polity Press. †¢ Yuval-Davis, Nira. 1997a. â€Å"Women, Citizenship and Difference. † Feminist Review 57: 4-27.